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ChickensH9N2 and H5N1 viruses and their spread and re-emergence across Eurasia raise
concern that prior H9N2 virus infection may limit the detection of subsequent H5N1 infection in gallinaceous
poultry by attenuating the severity of disease. We show that H9N2 viruses isolated from Israeli turkeys
during 2000–2004 were antigenically and genetically distinguishable. These three H9N2 viruses caused no
overt signs of disease in chickens. The 2004 isolate replicated and spread most efﬁciently, and chickens
previously inoculated with this H9N2 virus showed 90%–100% survival after inoculation 1 to 35 days later
with lethal H5N1 virus. Chickens that survived did not show signs of disease but did shed lethal H5N1 virus
from the cloaca. The modulation of survivability was time-dependent; the effect was maximal 5 days after
H9N2 inoculation. These ﬁndings suggest that co-circulation of H9N2 viruses can contribute to the spread of
lethal H5N1 viruses.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
Avian inﬂuenza viruses of the H9N2 subtype have been implicated
in the genesis of highly pathogenic (HP) H5N1 strains and in the
outcome of HP H5N1-associated disease (Webster et al., 2006). The G1
genotype of the H9N2 virus that circulated in Hong Kong's live poultry
markets in 1997 (A/Quail/HongKong/G1/97) contained six internal
genes of the H5N1 virus (A/HongKong/157/97) isolated from humans
at that time (Guan et al., 1999, 2000; Lin et al., 2000). The surprisingly
low mortality rate of gallinaceous poultry in the Hong Kong markets
during that period is explained in part by cross-protective cell-
mediated immunity induced by the G1 genotype of the H9N2 virus
(Seo and Webster, 2001).
H9N2 viruses of gallinaceous poultry spread from Asia to most
Eurasian countries during the 1990s (Aamir et al., 2007; Alexander,
2007). These viruses have circulated widely and cause only low-grade
disease in gallinaceous poultry. An unanswered question is whether
prior infection with H9N2 viruses reduces the lethality and therefore
the detectability of HP H5N1 infection in poultry in the ﬁeld, thereby
facilitating virus spread.
In Israel, H9N2 inﬂuenza viruses were ﬁrst detected in poultry in
May 2000, when they caused signs of mild respiratory disease and a
drop in egg production, mainly in turkeys. After the initial outbreak,ster).
l rights reserved.H9N2 viruses were not detected again until December 2001, and they
continued to circulate in poultry until April 2003, causing disease
outbreaks in chickens, geese, ostriches, and turkeys. A non-homo-
logous inactivated vaccine was widely used to control H9N2 virus
spread. H9N2 viruses were introduced a third time in February 2003
andwere isolated sporadically through 2006, primarily from chickens.
In March 2006, HP H5N1 virus was detected in Israel. All ﬂocks
affected by H5N1 had been vaccinated against H9N2 infection, but
evidence of co-infection with H9N2 viruses was observed in the Gaza
strip region. As many as one million birds were culled to stop the
spread of the H5N1 outbreak (Perk et al., 2007).
The spread of HP H5N1 to poultry in Israel, where H9N2 inﬂuenza
viruses continued to circulate, allowed us to assess whether the
current H9N2 viruses can moderate the lethality of co-circulating HP
H5N1 viruses and thus decrease the likelihood of their detection. We
antigenically and molecularly characterized three H9N2 viruses
isolated from domestic turkeys in Israel and determined experimen-
tally whether these viruses inﬂuence the pathogenicity of HP H5N1.
We found that some H9N2 inﬂuenza viruses modulate the lethality of
H5N1 challenge in a time-dependent fashion.
Results
Sequence and phylogenetic analysis of H9N2 inﬂuenza viruses
Complete sequencing of the HA and NA genes of the three Israeli
H9N2 inﬂuenza isolates conﬁrmed that they were of the H9 subtype
33A. Khalenkov et al. / Virology 383 (2009) 32–38andwere closely inter-related (Fig.1). Therewas 96% identity in amino
acid sequences between the HA gene of 2004 virus and the 2000 and
2002 viruses, whereas homology between the 2000 and 2002 viruses
was close to 99%. The neuraminidase (NA) gene showed 98.5%Fig. 1. Representation of amino-acid differences between the three H9N2 viruses. Upper seq
letters indicate amino acids. Dark bars indicate changes in the two other H9N2 viruses as com
identical in the three viruses. H9 numbering was used for the HA gene.similarity in the 2000 and 2002 viruses and 96.3% similarity between
those two isolates and the 2004 virus. The internal genes differed by
an average of 4% (96%–98% similarity of amino acid sequence). Greater
divergence in nucleotide sequences (89%–92% similarity) wasuence in each graph is the sequence of the reference virus, A/ty/Israel/1567/04. Capital
pared to the reference sequence; white bars indicate no change. Positions not shown are
Table 1
Percent nucleotide sequence identity of internal proteins of the three Israeli H9N2 virus
isolates compared to those of the A/Ck/Israel/364/2006 (H5N1) virus
Protein A/ty/Israel/965/00 A/ty/Israel/90710/02 A/ty/Israel/1567/04
NP 91.1 90.6 90.4
NS 91.0 91.2 90.5
M 91.4 91.2 91.4
PA 91.4 91.2 91.4
PB1 90.1 90.1 89.3
PB2 91.4 91.2 91.4
Fig. 2. Simpliﬁed phylogenetic tree of (A) the HA gene and (B) the NA gene of the Israeli
H9N2 viruses.
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challenge H5N1 virus A/Ck/Israel/364/06 (Table 1). The identity of
the surface glycoproteins of challenge viruses A/Ck/Israel/364/06
(H5N1) and A/Ck/Egypt/1C/06 (H5N1) was found to be 99.9% (data
not shown).
Phylogenetic analysis of the HA genes of the three Israeli H9N2
isolates showed that they are genetically closely related to A/Quail/
Hong Kong/G1/97 (H9N2) and fall into group 1 of the H9N2 inﬂuenza
virus phylogeny (Perk et al., 2006; Banet-Noach et al., 2007). The HA
genes of the three viruses continued to diverge and formed a sister
group with the H9N2 viruses isolated in Hong Kong during 1997–
1999, indicating their evolution from these viruses (Fig. 2A). The HA
gene of the 2004 isolate was more closely related to the G1 reference
strain [A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (H9N2)] than was the HA of the
2000 and 2002 isolates. Phylogenetic analysis of the NA genes showed
the same pattern (Fig. 2B), as did analysis of the internal genes (data
not shown).
Growth and antigenic characterization of the H9N2 inﬂuenza viruses
The three H9N2 inﬂuenza viruses replicated in embryonated
chicken eggs and, to a lesser extent, in Madin Darby canine kidney
(MDCK) cells (Table 2, Fig. 3). In cell culture, A/ty/Israel/1567/04
(H9N2) replicated to higher titers than the other two strains. HI tests
with chicken antisera and a panel of monoclonal antibodies conﬁrmed
the H9 subtype of the viruses but showed antigenic drift in
comparison to the reference H9N2 viruses isolated in Hong Kong in
1997 (Table 3). The 2004 isolate was most closely related to reference
virus A/Qa/HK/G1/97 H9N2. The HA activity of A/ty/Israel/1567/04
(H9N2) was also slightly inhibited by antibodies to the A/Dk/HK/Y280/
97 strain, suggesting that the 2004 isolate is antigenically closer to A/
Qa/HK/G1/97 (H9N2) than to the other reference H9N2 viruses shown
in Table 3 and is antigenically distinguishable from the other two
Israeli H9N2 isolates.
Replication and transmission of H9N2 viruses in chickens
Because the H9N2 inﬂuenza viruses affected both chickens and
turkeys in Israel, we used chickens—which are smaller and easier to
handle in isolators—for in vivo studies. No adaptation of viruses was
done prior to inoculation. The A/ty/Israel/965/02 (H9N2) virus
replicated to a limited extent in 9-week-old White Leghorn chickens
but was not transmitted to contact chickens introduced into the
same cage 24 h p.i. The A/ty/Israel/90710/00 and A/ty/Israel/1567/04
viruses replicated to moderate titers in the tracheas of inoculated
chickens, were detected for 7 days, and were transmitted to contact
chickens (Table 4); A/ty/Israel/1567/04 was transmitted more
effectively than the 2000 isolate at an early stage of infection and
replicated more rapidly and to higher titers in contact birds. None of
the inoculated or contact birds showed visible signs of disease and
all groups continued to gain weight. Only low titers of viruses were
isolated from cloacal swabs, and only transiently; virus was isolated
at higher titers and with greater frequency from the trachea. Water
samples from the feeding trays were collected and analyzed for the2004 isolate, which was found at relatively high titers up to day 6
(2.3 log10EID50/ml at day 6).
Cross-protection studies
Previous studies demonstrated cross-protection between the A/
Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (H9N2) variant isolated in 1997 and the lethal
H5N1 virus circulating at that time (Seo and Webster, 2001). Since
then, both the H9N2 and H5N1 viruses have continued to evolve and
little attention has been paid to the consequences of their co-
Table 3
Antigenic characterization of viruses by HI assay with anti-H9 monoclonal antibodies
and polyclonal chicken antisera
H9N2 virus Polyclonal chicken antiseraa Anti-H9 monoclonal antibodies
αA/ty/Israel/
90710/00
αA/ty/Israel/
1567/04
αA/Qa/
HK/G1/97
αA/Ck/
HK/G9/97
αA/Dk/HK/
Y280/97
G1–26 G9–6 18G4 2F4
A/ty/Israel/
90710/00
40 160 200 200 bb b
A/ty/Israel/
965/02
80 80 100 800 b b
A/ty/Israel/
1567/04
320 640 12,800 200 100 1600
A/Qa/HK/
G1/97
80 320 6400 3200 b b
A/Ch/HK/
G9/97
160 1280 3200 6400 3200 3200
A/Dk/HK/
Y280/97
80 320 800 6400 25,600 25,600
a Polyclonal anti-H9 antisera obtained at day 28 p.i. with H9N2 virus. To remove non-
speciﬁc inhibitors of agglutination, serum was incubated overnight with receptor-
destroying enzyme and heated for 30 min at 56 °C. The initial dilution was 1:40.
b b Indicates a titer less than 1:100 (the initial dilution of the antibodies).
Table 2
Replication of H9N2 viruses
H9N2 virus Chicken embryos MDCK cells MDCK cells
(Log10EID50/ml) (Log10PFU/ml) (Log10TCID50/ml)
A/ty/Israel/90710/00 9.2 7.0 3.6
A/ty/Israel/965/02 8.8 7.7 4.7
A/ty/Israel/1567/04 8.7 8.1 6.0
Table 4
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H9N2 isolates on the course of infection with currently-circulating
highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, we inoculated chickens with the three
H9N2 isolates and subsequently challenged them with lethal H5N1
virus.
Effect of the H9N2 variants on H5N1 mortality and signs of disease
In the ﬁrst experiment, groups of four chickens were inoculated
with the three H9N2 inﬂuenza viruses, respectively, and infectionwas
conﬁrmed via tracheal and cloacal swabs. None of the infected birds
showed signs of disease. Thirty-ﬁve days after inoculation, the
inoculated birds and a non-inoculated control group were challenged
with 10 CLD50 of the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus A/Chicken/Egypt/
1C/06. The control groups and the groups initially infected with the
2000 and 2002 H9N2 viruses showed signs of severe disease starting 2
to 3 days after challenge, and all birds were dead by the ninth day
post-challenge (Fig. 4A).
Disease signs and their severity did not differ between the controls
and birds previously infected with 2000 (A/ty/Israel/90710/00) and
2002 (A/ty/Israel/965/02) H9N2 viruses, but the latter birds died 1 day
later than control birds. Mean survival days for the control group, the
group inoculated with A/ty/Israel/965/2000, and the group inoculated
with A/ty/Israel/90710/2002 were 5.2, 5.8 and 6.5, respectively. In
contrast, 50% of chickens previously infected with the 2004 H9N2
virus (A/ty/Israel/1567/04) showed no visible signs of disease and
survived, while 2 of the 4 died on day 9 after challenge. The birds that
died had continued to shed HPH5N1 virus from the trachea and cloaca
between days 7 and 9 post-challenge. One chicken that survived shed
H5N1 virus until day 5 post-challenge, at a relatively high titer (3.2
log10EID50/ml on day 3).
The same survival pattern was observed when groups of seven
birds were inoculated with the same H9N2 isolates. Twenty-four
hours after inoculation with the H9N2 viruses, three naïve contact
birds were introduced into each group and all birds were challenged
simultaneously at day 21 p.i. with 10 CLD50 of the highly pathogenic
H5N1 virus A/Chicken/Israel/364/06. All control chickens succumbed
to the infection at day 4. All chickens inoculated with 2000 and 2002
H9N2 viruses were dead by days 9 and 12, respectively. The birds that
succumbed shed the H5N1 virus from the trachea and cloaca untilFig. 3. Replication kinetics of the three H9N2 viruses in MDCK cells.their deaths. However, only 4 of 10 chickens died in the group
previously inoculated with the A/ty/Israel/1567/04 isolate (Fig. 4B).
Notably, mortality was observed only within the group of inoculated
birds; all contact chickens survived. Birds that survived did not show
any virus replication in the trachea and only trace amounts (less than
1.5 log10EID50/ml) of H5N1 virus in the cloaca.
Time-dependence of cross-protection
Earlier studies showed that cell-mediated immunity was respon-
sible for cross-protection between H9N2 and HP H5N1 viruses;
immunity was transferable among inbred chickens via immune cells
but not serum (Seo et al., 2002). Because circulating cell-mediated
immunity is of shorter duration than humoral immunity, protection
from HP H5N1 viruses may diminish with increasing time after H9N2
infection.
To test this hypothesis, we inoculated groups of 10 chickens with
the 2004 H9N2 Israeli strain (A/ty/Israel/1567/04) and challenged
them 5, 20, and 35 days later with 10 CLD50 of highly pathogenic A/
Chicken/Israel/364/06 (H5N1) virus. Before challenge, serum samples
were collected from all three groups of birds and tested by HI; all
samples, including those collected 35 days p.i., were nonreactive with
the challenge virus (reciprocal of HI titer was less than 10). As in the
previous experiment, all of the control birds died by day 9. None of theTracheal and cloacal shedding of virus after inoculation with three H9N2 viruses
Virus Inoculated (n=7) Contact (n=3)
3 d.p.i. 5 d.p.i. 7 d.p.i. 3 d.p.i 5 d.p.i 7 d.p.i.
Mean tracheal virus titersa and tracheal shedding (no. shedding/total)
A/ty/Israel/
90710/2000
3.8 (1/7) 2 (6/7) 1.2 (2/7) 2.5 (1/3) 3.7 (2/3) 5(3/3)
A/ty/Israel/
965/2002
4.5 (3/7) 3 (7/7) 2.7 (3/7) 0 (0/3) 0 (0/3) 0 (0/3)
A/ty/Israel/
1567/2004
5.6 (3/7) 4.4 (7/7) 3 (6/7) 5.4 (3/3) 5.3 (3/3) 2.9 (3/3)
Mean cloacala virus titers and cloacal shedding (no. shedding/total)
A/ty/Israel/
90710/2000
1.2 (1/7) 1.5 (1/7) 0 (0/7) 0 (0/3) 0 (0/3) 2.35 (2/3)
A/ty/Israel/
965/2002
1.2 (2/7) 0 (0/7) 0 (0/7) 0 (0/3) 0 (0/3) 0 (0/3)
A/ty/Israel/
1567/2004
1.1 (3/7) 1.7 (3/7) 0.5 (2/7) 1.9 (2.3) 2.1 (2/3) 0.5 (1/3)
a Expressed as log10EID50/ml.
Fig. 6. Survival of chickens challenged with 10 CLD50 of the highly pathogenic A/Ck/
Israel/364/06 virus 1, 3, or 5 days after inoculation with the A/ty/Israel/04 (H9N2) virus
(n=10 chickens per group).
Fig. 4. (A) Survival of chickens challenged with 10 CLD50 of the highly pathogenic A/Ck/
Egypt/1C/06 (H5N1) virus 35 days after inoculation with the three Israeli H9N2 isolates
(4 chickens per group). (B) Survival of chickens challenged with 10 CLD50 of the highly
pathogenic A/Ck/Israel/364/06 (H5N1) virus 21 days after inoculation with the three
Israeli H9N2 isolates (10 chickens per group).
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showed signs of disease, and all of them survived. Ninety percent (9 of
10) of birds inoculated with H9N2 20 or 35 days before H5N1
challenge survived without signs of disease (Fig. 5).
To study H9N2-mediated protection at early stages of H9N2
infection, we challenged groups of ﬁve birds with 10 CLD50 of the A/
Chicken/Israel/364/06 (H5N1) virus 1, 3, or 5 days after inoculation
with A/ty/Israel/1567/04 (H9N2) virus (Fig. 6). As in the previous
experiment, all birds challenged on day 5 survived without signs of
disease. Two of the ﬁve birds challenged on day 3 died, and four of the
ﬁve birds challenged on day 1 died. All of the birds that died showed
signs of disease, whereas those that survived did not. Therefore, cross-Fig. 5. Survival of chickens challenged with 10 CLD50 of the highly pathogenic A/Ck/
Israel/364/06 (H5N1) virus 5, 20, or 35 days after inoculation with the A/Ty/Israel/1567/
04 (H9N2) virus (n=10 chickens per group).protection increased progressively from day 1 to day 5 after
inoculation.
Discussion
H9N2 and HP H5N1 viruses have continuously co-circulated in
domestic poultry throughout Eurasia since 1997. The HP H5N1
viruses initially isolated in Hong Kong in 1997 shared internal gene
segments with H9N2 viruses isolated from live poultry markets at
that time (Guan et al., 1999; Shortridge et al., 1998). However, both
the H9N2 and the HP H5N1 viruses have continued to evolve and
have formed a number of clades and subclades (WHO, 2007, 2008;
Xu et al., 2007). Therefore, it was unknown whether the currently
circulating H9N2 viruses limit the detection of subsequent H5N1
infection by reducing its lethality. After large-scale culling was
required in Israel to stop the spread of an H5N1 outbreak in poultry
ﬂocks, we investigated the potential role of co-circulating H9N2
viruses in the spread of HP H5N1.
We ﬁrst characterized the H9N2 viruses isolated from turkeys
during outbreaks in Israeli poultry in 2000, 2002, and 2004 (Perk et al.,
2006). These three viruses were antigenically distinct. Phylogenetic
analysis of the HA genes revealed that two distinguishable groups of
H9N2 viruses arose from the G1 lineage (A/Quail/HongKong/G1/97)
circulating in Hong Kong in 1997. In serological analysis against a
panel of anti-H9 monoclonal antibodies, the 2004 isolate was
antigenically more closely related to A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 than
were the 2000 and 2002 isolates. Phylogenetic analysis of all genes
further conﬁrmed this ﬁnding. The 2004 H9N2 isolate also replicated
more efﬁciently in chickens than the earlier two isolates and was
transmitted more efﬁciently to contact chickens. Interestingly, we
found as much as 2.5 log10EID50/ml of the 2004 isolate in the drinking
water of infected chickens on day 5 p.i. (data not shown); this ﬁnding
suggests how the virus may have been transmitted to naïve birds on
poultry farms. None of the three H9N2 isolates caused overt signs of
disease.
Only the H9N2 inﬂuenza virus that replicated and was transmitted
efﬁciently in chickens modulated disease caused by HP H5N1 virus.
Protection against mortality increased progressively between days 1
and 5 after inoculation with A/ty/Israel/1567/04 (H9N2) virus and
declined slightly (by approximately 10%) afterward. All chickens
challenged 5 days after H9N2 inoculation survived. After 35 days, 50%
of chickens survived a lethal dose of A/Egypt/1C/06 (H5N1) virus and
90% survived a lethal dose of A/Chicken/Israel/364/06 (H5N1) virus.
Because the Israeli and Egyptian H5N1 viruses are genetically and
biologically closely related (Perk et al., 2006), the difference in
survival is likely to reﬂect variations in the outbred chickens and
possibly the 2-week older average age of chickens inoculated with the
Israeli H5N1 virus.
37A. Khalenkov et al. / Virology 383 (2009) 32–38A/ty/Israel/1567/04, the H9N2 isolate that modulated H5N1
pathogenicity, differed from the other two isolates in all eight gene
segments, although the three isolates had greater than 96% amino acid
similarity in all gene segments (Fig. 1). While molecular differences,
especially those in the surface genes, are likely to explain the disparate
modulation of H5N1 pathogenicity, further studies will be needed to
identify the factors responsible.
Our results suggest that A/ty/Israel/1567/04 grows to higher titers
in chickens and persists longer than the other two H9N2 viruses
studied. Because virus burden is strongly correlated with the T-cell
response in non-lethal inﬂuenza, it is possible that the 2004 virus
exerts a stronger priming effect on cellular immunity. The absence of
protective serum antibodies to H5N1 viruses in chickens infected with
H9N2 viruses supports a major role for cellular immunity. The
contamination of our H9N2 virus stock with H5N1 viruses was ruled
out by molecular methods.
Does the modulation of H5N1 pathogenicity by cross-protective
immunity to H9N2 help to perpetuate H5N1 viruses in domestic
poultry? If chickens are infected with HP H5N1 virus during the
“protected window” after H9N2 infection, an initial outbreak of HP
H5N1 may go unnoticed while the virus is shed (predominantly in
feces) by protected birds and becomes more widespread. Our results
suggest that some strains of H9N2 virus, but not others, can modulate
the severity of disease caused by HP H5N1 virus and provide partial
protection against lethal challenge under the conditions tested.
Interestingly, even closely related H9N2 viruses may differ in their
protective effect.
The masking of H5N1 pathogenicity is not an issue for countries
that use a “stamping out” policy after detection of HP H5N1, as both
viruses would be stamped out. However, masking of H5N1 disease
signs by H9N2 is a potentially important problem for countries that
use H5N1 vaccines and cull ﬂocks only when clinical disease is
evident. Because the use of sentinel chickens for detection of HP H5N1
in vaccinated ﬂocks can be compromised by immunity to H9N2 virus,
we suggest that prospective virologic surveillance offers the best
solution.
The decade-long circulation of HP H5N1 in Southeast Asia, which
has remained a reservoir of evolving strains (Kilpatrick et al., 2006),
and the circulation of HP H5N1 since 2005 in parts of Africa and
Eurasia, have led to a “blame game”. Some countries and authorities
consider wild migratory birds to be the ultimate reservoir and
spreaders of highly pathogenic viruses. Conversely, wild-bird eco-
logists and wildlife authorities consider domestic waterfowl to be the
current reservoirs of HP H5N1, while migratory species are
occasionally infected and may spread HP H5N1 but do not per-
petuate the virus. The rate of H9N2 co-infection and the prevalence
of H9N2-mediated protection against HP H5N1 virus are unknown
but may be contributors to the continued circulation of pockets of
H5N1 virus.
The co-circulation of H9N2 and lethal H5N1 viruses may be
contributing to the genetic diversity of both subtypes, with the
possibility of reassortment of individual genes. While H9N2 viruses
cause no signs of disease in experimentally inoculated birds, signs of
disease are observed in the ﬁeld, especially in cases of concurrent
stress or co-infection (Banet-Noach et al., 2007). Inactivated H9N2
vaccines are coming into wider use and may help to reduce H9N2
disease severity and the potential masking of infection with highly
pathogenic H5N1 viruses.
Materials and methods
Viruses
We characterized three H9N2 viruses isolated from turkeys in
Israel in 2000, 2002, and 2004: A/ty/Israel/90710/00, A/ty/GivatHain/
965/02, and A/ty/Israel/1567/04. The A/Chicken/Egypt/1C/2006 andA/Chicken/Israel/364/2006 HP H5N1 inﬂuenza viruses were used in
challenge experiments. All viruses were propagated in the allantoic
cavities of 11-day-old embryonated chicken eggs in a biosafety level
3+ (BSL3+) facility approved by the USDA.
Antigenic analysis
We analyzed the cross-reactivity of the H9N2 viruses by
hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay with polyclonal antisera and
anti-H9 monoclonal antibodies to three H9N2 viruses representing
the Asian lineages in poultry: A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (A/Qa/HK/
G1/97), A/Chicken/Hong Kong/G9/97 (A/Ck/HK/G9/97), and A/Duck/
Hong Kong/Y280/97 (A/Dk/HK/Y280/97). Methods were described
previously (Palmer et al., 1975).
Genetic and sequence analysis
RNA was extracted from infected allantoic ﬂuid by using the
RNeasy Mini Kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA). Real-time polymerase chain
reaction (RT-PCR) was performed with the OneStep RT-PCR Kit
(Qiagen, Valencia, CA), and the PCR products were sequenced by
using synthetic oligonucleotides produced by the Hartwell Center for
Bioinformatics and Biotechnology at St. Jude Children's Research
Hospital (St. Jude). Sequence results for all genes of the three isolates
are available from GenBank under accession numbers: AY738451,
EF492273, EF492371, EF492400, EF492342, EF492302, EF492244,
DQ683025 (A/ty/Israel/90710/00); AY738452, EF492289, EF492387,
EF492416, EF492358, EF492318, EF492271, DQ683035 (A/ty/Israel/
965/02); EF492241, EF492297, EF492395, EF492424, EF492366,
EF492326, EF492264, DQ683043 (A/ty/Israel/1567/04). HA genes of
the 2000 and 2002 isolates are also referred in the NCBI database as A/
ty/Neve Ilan/90710/00 and A/ty/Givat Haim/965/02, respectively.
Sequence results for all genes of the challenge virus A/Ck/Israel/364/
06 are available from GenBank under accession numbers: EF532635,
EF532624, EU574919, EU579978, EU579972, EU579966, EU579960,
and EU579954.
Phylogenetic analysis
Nucleotide and deduced amino acid sequences were aligned and
all sequence data were compiled and edited by using the BioEdit
program with the ClustalW alignment package (Thompson et al.,
1994). Phylogenetic trees were generated and bootstrapped by using
the Phylip program, version 3.67.
Tests in animals
Depending on the experiment, four, seven, or ten 6- to 8-week-old
White Leghorn chickens were inoculated with 1.0 ml of virus dilution
in PBS containing 106 50% egg infectious doses (EID50) per milliliter via
a “natural route” (intranasal [0.3 ml], intraocular [0.1 ml], or
intratracheal [0.6 ml]). Contact birds were introduced into the
inoculated birds' cages 24 h post-inoculation (p.i.) to study virus
transmission. All birds were observed daily for signs of disease
(disheveled feathers, lethargy, fever, or paralysis), mortality, and
weight change. Tracheal and cloacal swabswere collected on days 3, 5,
7, and 10 p.i., and virus was titrated in 10-day-old embryonated
chicken eggs. Serum samples collected from all birds before inocula-
tion and 4 weeks after inoculation were analyzed via HI assay in
microtiter plates with 0.5% chicken red blood cells. To assess cross-
protective immunity induced by H9N2 viruses, chickens were then
challenged via natural route with 10 chicken lethal doses (CLD50) of A/
Chicken/Egypt/1C/2006 or A/Chicken/Israel/364/2006 HP H5N1 virus
and observed daily for signs of disease and mortality. All animal
experiments using H5N1 and H9N2 viruses were done in USDA-
approved BSL3+ facilities. All studies were conducted under applicable
38 A. Khalenkov et al. / Virology 383 (2009) 32–38laws and guidelines and after approval from the Animal Care and Use
Committee at St. Jude.
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